Chapter 4 Correlation Summary


Please summarize the Chapter 4 Correlation of This book.

Here is the requirement: The first paragraph will summarize the context/story discussed in the chapter, the second paragraph will discuss the key statistical concepts introduced in the chapter, and, in the third paragraph, you can provide examples how you see the statistical concepts introduced in the chapter being used in your surroundings.

naked statistics
Stripping the Dread from the Data
For Katrina
Title Page
Introduction: Why I hated calculus but love statistics
1 What’s the Point?
2 Descriptive Statistics: Who was the best baseball player of all time?
Appendix to Chapter 2
3 Deceptive Description: “He’s got a great personality!” and other true but grossly
misleading statements
4 Correlation: How does Netflix know what movies I like?
Appendix to Chapter 4
5 Basic Probability: Don’t buy the extended warranty on your $99 printer
5½ The Monty Hall Problem
6 Problems with Probability: How overconfident math geeks nearly destroyed the
global financial system
7 The Importance of Data: “Garbage in, garbage out”
8 The Central Limit Theorem: The Lebron James of statistics
9 Inference: Why my statistics professor thought I might have cheated
Appendix to Chapter 9
10 Polling: How we know that 64 percent of Americans support the death penalty
(with a sampling error ± 3 percent)
Appendix to Chapter 10
11 Regression Analysis: The miracle elixir
Appendix to Chapter 11
12 Common Regression Mistakes: The mandatory warning label
13 Program Evaluation: Will going to Harvard change your life?
Conclusion: Five questions that statistics can help answer
Appendix: Statistical software
Also by Charles Wheelan
Why I hated calculus but love statistics
I have always had an uncomfortable relationship with math. I don’t like numbers for the sake of
numbers. I am not impressed by fancy formulas that have no real-world application. I particularly
disliked high school calculus for the simple reason that no one ever bothered to tell me why I needed
to learn it. What is the area beneath a parabola? Who cares?
In fact, one of the great moments of my life occurred during my senior year of high school, at the
end of the first semester of Advanced Placement Calculus. I was working away on the final exam,
admittedly less prepared for the exam than I ought to have been. (I had been accepted to my firstchoice college a few weeks earlier, which had drained away what little motivation I had for the
course.) As I stared at the final exam questions, they looked completely unfamiliar. I don’t mean that I
was having trouble answering the questions. I mean that I didn’t even recognize what was being
asked. I was no stranger to being unprepared for exams, but, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, I
usually knew what I didn’t know. This exam looked even more Greek than usual. I flipped through the
pages of the exam for a while and then more or less surrendered. I walked to the front of the
classroom, where my calculus teacher, whom we’ll call Carol Smith, was proctoring the exam. “Mrs.
Smith,” I said, “I don’t recognize a lot of the stuff on the test.”
Suffice it to say that Mrs. Smith did not like me a whole lot more than I liked her. Yes, I can now
admit that I sometimes used my limited powers as student association president to schedule all-school
assemblies just so that Mrs. Smith’s calculus class would be canceled. Yes, my friends and I did have
flowers delivered to Mrs. Smith during class from “a secret admirer” just so that we could chortle
away in the back of the room as she looked around in embarrassment. And yes, I did stop doing any
homework at all once I got in to college.
So when I walked up to Mrs. Smith in the middle of the exam and said that the material did not
look familiar, she was, well, unsympathetic. “Charles,” she said loudly, ostensibly to me but facing
the rows of desks to make certain that the whole class could hear, “if you had studied, the material
would look a lot more familiar.” This was a compelling point.
So I slunk back to my desk. After a few minutes, Brian Arbetter, a far better calculus student than I,
walked to the front of the room and whispered a few things to Mrs. Smith. She whispered back and
then a truly extraordinary thing happened. “Class, I need your attention,” Mrs. Smith announced. “It
appears that I have given you the second semester exam by mistake.” We were far enough into the test
period that the whole exam had to be aborted and rescheduled.
I cannot fully describe my euphoria. I would go on in life to marry a wonderful woman. We have
three healthy children. I’ve published books and visited places like the Taj Mahal and Angkor Wat.
Still, the day that my calculus teacher got her comeuppance is a top five life moment. (The fact that I
nearly failed the makeup final exam did not significantly diminish this wonderful life experience.)
The calculus exam incident tells you much of what you need to know about my relationship with
mathematics—but not everything. Curiously, I loved physics in high school, even though physics
relies very heavily on the very same calculus that I refused to do in Mrs. Smith’s class. Why?
Because physics has a clear purpose. I distinctly remember my high school physics teacher showing
us during the World Series how we could use the basic formula for acceleration to estimate how far a
home run had been hit. That’s cool—and the same formula has many more socially significant
Once I arrived in college, I thoroughly enjoyed probability, again because it offered insight into
interesting real-life situations. In hindsight, I now recognize that it wasn’t the math that bothered me in
calculus class; it was that no one ever saw fit to explain the point of it. If you’re not fascinated by the
elegance of formulas alone—which I am most emphatically not—then it is just a lot of tedious and
mechanistic formulas, at least the way it was taught to me.
That brings me to statistics (which, for the purposes of this book, includes probability). I love
statistics. Statistics can be used to explain everything from DNA testing to the idiocy of playing the
lottery. Statistics can help us identify the factors associated with diseases like cancer and heart
disease; it can help us spot cheating on standardized tests. Statistics can even help you win on game
shows. There was a famous program during my childhood called Let’s Make a Deal , with its equally
famous host, Monty Hall. At the end of each day’s show, a successful player would stand with Monty
facing three big doors: Door no. 1, Door no. 2, and Door no. 3. Monty Hall explained to the player
that there was a highly desirable prize behind one of the doors—something like a new car—and a
goat behind the other two. The idea was straightforward: the player chose one of the doors and would
get the contents behind that door.
As each player stood facing the doors with Monty Hall, he or she had a 1 in 3 chance of choosing
the door that would be opened to reveal the valuable prize. But Let’s Make a Deal had a twist, which
has delighted statisticians ever since (and perplexed everyone else). After the player chose a door,
Monty Hall would open one of the two remaining doors, always revealing a goat. For the sake of
example, assume that the player has chosen Door no. 1. Monty would then open Door no. 3; the live
goat would be standing there on stage. Two doors would still be closed, nos. 1 and 2. If the valuable
prize was behind no. 1, the contestant would win; if it was behind no. 2, he would lose. But then
things got more interesting: Monty would turn to the player and ask whether he would like to change
his mind and switch doors (from no. 1 to no. 2 in this case). Remember, both doors were still closed,
and the only new information the contestant had received was that a goat showed up behind one of the
doors that he didn’t pick.
Should he switch?
The answer is yes. Why? That’s in Chapter 5½.
The paradox of statistics is that they are everywhere—from batting averages to presidential polls—
but the discipline itself has a reputation for being uninteresting and inaccessible. Many statistics
books and classes are overly laden with math and jargon. Believe me, the technical details are crucial
(and interesting)—but it’s just Greek if you don’t understand the intuition. And you may not even care
about the intuition if you’re not convinced that there is any reason to learn it. Every chapter in this
book promises to answer the basic question that I asked (to no effect) of my high school calculus
teacher: What is the point of this?
This book is about the intuition. It is short on math, equations, and graphs; when they are used, I
promise that they will have a clear and enlightening purpose. Meanwhile, the book is long on
examples to convince you that there are great reasons to learn this stuff. Statistics can be really
interesting, and most of it isn’t that difficult.
The idea for this book was born not terribly long after my unfortunate experience in Mrs. Smith’s
AP Calculus class. I went to graduate school to study economics and public policy. Before the
program even started, I was assigned (not surprisingly) to “math camp” along with the bulk of my
classmates to prepare us for the quantitative rigors that were to follow. For three weeks, we learned
math all day in a windowless, basement classroom (really).
On one of those days, I had something very close to a career epiphany. Our instructor was trying to
teach us the circumstances under which the sum of an infinite series converges to a finite number. Stay
with me here for a minute because this concept will become clear. (Right now you’re probably
feeling the way I did in that windowless classroom.) An infinite series is a pattern of numbers that
goes on forever, such as 1 + ½ + ¼ + ⅛ . . . The three dots means that the pattern continues to
This is the part we were having trouble wrapping our heads around. Our instructor was trying to
convince us, using some proof I’ve long since forgotten, that a series of numbers can go on forever
and yet still add up (roughly) to a finite number. One of my classmates, Will Warshauer, would have
none of it, despite the impressive mathematical proof. (To be honest, I was a bit skeptical myself.)
How can something that is infinite add up to something that is finite?
Then I got an inspiration, or more accurately, the intuition of what the instructor was trying to
explain. I turned to Will and talked him through what I had just worked out in my head. Imagine that
you have positioned yourself exactly 2 feet from a wall.
Now move half the distance to that wall (1 foot), so that you are left standing 1 foot away.
From 1 foot away, move half the distance to the wall once again (6 inches, or ½ a foot). And from
6 inches away, do it again (move 3 inches, or ¼ of a foot). Then do it again (move 1½ inches, or ⅛
of a foot). And so on.
You will gradually get pretty darn close to the wall. (For example, when you are 1/1024th of an
inch from the wall, you will move half the distance, or another 1/2048th of an inch.) But you will
never hit the wall, because by definition each move takes you only half the remaining distance. In
other words, you will get infinitely close to the wall but never hit it. If we measure your moves in
feet, the series can be described as 1 + ½ + ¼ + ⅛ . . .
Therein lies the insight: Even though you will continue moving forever—with each move taking
you half the remaining distance to the wall—the total distance you travel can never be more than 2
feet, which is your starting distance from the wall. For mathematical purposes, the total distance you
travel can be approximated as 2 feet, which turns out to be very handy for computation purposes. A
mathematician would say that the sum of this infinite series 1 ft + ½ ft + ¼ ft + ⅛ ft . . . converges to
2 feet, which is what our instructor was trying to teach us that day.
The point is that I convinced Will. I convinced myself. I can’t remember the math proving that the
sum of an infinite series can converge to a finite number, but I can always look that up online. And
when I do, it will probably make sense. In my experience, the intuition makes the math and other
technical details more understandable—but not necessarily the other way around.
The point of this book is to make the most important statistical concepts more intuitive and more
accessible, not just for those of us forced to study them in windowless classrooms but for anyone
interested in the extraordinary power of numbers and data.
Now, having just made the case that the core tools of statistics are less intuitive and accessible than
they ought to be, I’m going to make a seemingly contradictory point: Statistics can be overly
accessible in the sense that anyone with data and a computer can do sophisticated statistical
procedures with a few keystrokes. The problem is that if the data are poor, or if the statistical
techniques are used improperly, the conclusions can be wildly misleading and even potentially
dangerous. Consider the following hypothetical Internet news flash: People Who Take Short Breaks
at Work Are Far More Likely to Die of Cancer. Imagine that headline popping up while you are
surfing the Web. According to a seemingly impressive study of 36,000 office workers (a huge data
set!), those workers who reported leaving their offices to take regular ten-minute breaks during the
workday were 41 percent more likely to develop cancer over the next five years than workers who
don’t leave their offices during the workday. Clearly we need to act on this kind of finding—perhaps
some kind of national awareness campaign to prevent short breaks on the job.
Or maybe we just need to think more clearly about what many workers are doing during that tenminute break. My professional experience suggests that many of those workers who report leaving
their offices for short breaks are huddled outside the entrance of the building smoking cigarettes
(creating a haze of smoke through which the rest of us have to walk in order to get in or out). I would
further infer that it’s probably the cigarettes, and not the short breaks from work, that are causing the
cancer. I’ve made up this example just so that it would be particularly absurd, but I can assure you
that many real-life statistical abominations are nearly this absurd once they are deconstructed.
Statistics is like a high-caliber weapon: helpful when used correctly and potentially disastrous in
the wrong hands. This book will not make you a statistical expert; it will teach you enough care and
respect for the field that you don’t do the statistical equivalent of blowing someone’s head off.
This is not a textbook, which is liberating in terms of the topics that have to be covered and the
ways in which they can be explained. The book has been designed to introduce the statistical
concepts with the most relevance to everyday life. How do scientists conclude that something causes
cancer? How does polling work (and what can go wrong)? Who “lies with statistics,” and how do
they do it? How does your credit card company use data on what you are buying to predict if you are
likely to miss a payment? (Seriously, they can do that.)
If you want to understand the numbers behind the news and to appreciate the extraordinary (and
growing) power of data, this is the stuff you need to know. In the end, I hope to persuade you of the
observation first made by Swedish mathematician and writer Andrejs Dunkels: It’s easy to lie with
statistics, but it’s hard to tell the truth without them.
But I have even bolder aspirations than that. I think you might actually enjoy statistics. The
underlying ideas are fabulously interesting and relevant. The key is to separate the important ideas
from the arcane technical details that can get in the way. That is Naked Statistics.
What’s the Point?
I’ve noticed a curious phenomenon. Students will complain that statistics is confusing and irrelevant.
Then the same students will leave the classroom and happily talk over lunch about batting averages
(during the summer) or the windchill factor (during the winter) or grade point averages (always).
They will recognize that the National Football League’s “passer rating”—a statistic that condenses a
quarterback’s performance into a single number—is a somewhat flawed and arbitrary measure of a
quarterback’s game day performance. The same data (completion rate, average yards per pass
attempt, percentage of touchdown passes per pass attempt, and interception rate) could be combined
in a different way, such as giving greater or lesser weight to any of those inputs, to generate a
different but equally credible measure of performance. Yet anyone who has watched football
recognizes that it’s handy to have a single number that can be used to encapsulate a quarterback’s
Is the quarterback rating perfect? No. Statistics rarely offers a single “right” way of doing anything.
Does it provide meaningful information in an easily accessible way? Absolutely. It’s a nice tool for
making a quick comparison between the performances of two quarterbacks on a given day. I am a
Chicago Bears fan. During the 2011 playoffs, the Bears played the Packers; the Packers won. There
are a lot of ways I could describe that game, including pages and pages of analysis and raw data. But
here is a more succinct analysis. Chicago Bears quarterback Jay Cutler had a passer rating of 31.8. In
contrast, Green Bay quarterback Aaron Rodgers had a passer rating of 55.4. Similarly, we can
compare Jay Cutler’s performance to that in a game earlier in the season against Green Bay, when he
had a passer rating of 85.6. That tells you a lot of what you need to know in order to understand why
the Bears beat the Packers earlier in the season but lost to them in the playoffs.
That is a very helpful synopsis of what happened on the field. Does it simplify things? Yes, that is
both the strength and the weakness of any descriptive statistic. One number tells you that Jay Cutler
was outgunned by Aaron Rodgers in the Bears’ playoff loss. On the other hand, that number won’t tell
you whether a quarterback had a bad break, such as throwing a perfect pass that was bobbled by the
receiver and then intercepted, or whether he “stepped up” on certain key plays (since every
completion is weighted the same, whether it is a crucial third down or a meaningless play at the end
of the game), or whether the defense was terrible. And so on.
The curious thing is that the same people who are perfectly comfortable discussing statistics in the
context of sports or the weather or grades will seize up with anxiety when a researcher starts to
explain something like the Gini index, which is a standard tool in economics for measuring income
inequality. I’ll explain what the Gini index is in a moment, but for now the most important thing to
recognize is that the Gini index is just like the passer rating. It’s a handy tool for collapsing
complex information into a single number. As such, it has the strengths of most descriptive statistics,
namely that it provides an easy way to compare the income distribution in two countries, or in a
single country at different points in time.
The Gini index measures how evenly wealth (or income) is shared within a country on a scale from
zero to one. The statistic can be calculated for wealth or for annual income, and it can be calculated
at the individual level or at the household level. (All of these statistics will be highly correlated but
not identical.) The Gini index, like the passer rating, has no intrinsic meaning; it’s a tool for
comparison. A country in which every household had identical wealth would have a Gini index of
zero. By contrast, a country in which a single household held the country’s entire wealth would have a
Gini index of one. As you can probably surmise, the closer a country is to one, the more unequal its
distribution of wealth. The United States has a Gini index of .45, according to the Central Intelligence
Agency (a great collector of statistics, by the way).1 So what?
Once that number is put into context, it can tell us a lot. For example, Sweden has a Gini index of
.23. Canada’s is .32. China’s is .42. Brazil’s is .54. South Africa’s is .65. * As we look across those
numbers, we get a sense of where the United States falls relative to the rest of the world when it
comes to income inequality. We can also compare different points in time. The Gini index for the
United States was .41 in 1997 and grew to .45 over the next decade. (The most recent CIA data are
for 2007.) This tells us in an objective way that while the United States grew richer over that period
of time, the distribution of wealth grew more unequal. Again, we can compare the changes in the Gini
index across countries over roughly the same time period. Inequality in Canada was basically
unchanged over the same stretch. Sweden has had significant economic growth over the past two
decades, but the Gini index in Sweden actually fell from .25 in 1992 to .23 in 2005, meaning that
Sweden grew richer and more equal over that period.
Is the Gini index the perfect measure of inequality? Absolutely not—just as the passer rating is not
a perfect measure of quarterback performance. But it certainly gives us some valuable information on
a socially significant phenomenon in a convenient format.
We have also slowly backed our way into answering the question posed in the chapter title: What
is the point? The point is that statistics helps us process data, which is really just a fancy name for
information. Sometimes the data are trivial in the grand scheme of things, as with sports statistics.
Sometimes they offer insight into the nature of human existence, as with the Gini index.
But, as any good infomercial would point out, That’s not all! Hal Varian, chief economist at
Google, told the New York Times that being a statistician will be “the sexy job” over the next
decade.2 I’ll be the first to concede that economists sometimes have a warped definition of “sexy.”
Still, consider the following disparate questions:
How can we catch schools that are cheating on their standardized tests?
How does Netflix know what kind of movies you like?
How can we figure out what substances or behaviors cause cancer, given that we cannot conduct
cancer-causing experiments on humans?
Does praying for surgical patients improve their outcomes?
Is there really an economic benefit to getting a degree from a highly selective college or
What is causing the rising incidence of autism?
Statistics can help answer these questions (or, we hope, can soon). The world is producing more
and more data, ever faster and faster. Yet, as the New York Times has noted, “Data is merely the raw
material of knowledge.”3* Statistics is the most powerful tool we have for using information to some
meaningful end, whether that is identifying underrated baseball players or paying teachers more
fairly. Here is a quick tour of how statistics can bring meaning to raw data.
Description and Comparison
A bowling score is a descriptive statistic. So is a batting average. Most American sports fans over
the age of five are already conversant in the field of descriptive statistics. We use numbers, in sports
and everywhere else in life, to summarize information. How good a baseball player was Mickey
Mantle? He was a career .298 hitter. To a baseball fan, that is a meaningful statement, which is
remarkable when you think about it, because it encapsulates an eighteen-season career. 4 (There is, I
suppose, something mildly depressing about having one’s lifework collapsed into a single number.)
Of course, baseball fans have also come to recognize that descriptive statistics other than batting
average may better encapsulate a player’s value on the field.
We evaluate the academic performance of high school and college students by means of a grade
point average, or GPA. A letter grade is assigned a point value; typically an A is worth 4 points, a B
is worth 3, a C is worth 2, and so on. By graduation, when high school students are applying to
college and college students are looking for jobs, the grade point average is a handy tool for
assessing their academic potential. Someone who has a 3.7 GPA is clearly a stronger student than
someone at the same school with a 2.5 GPA. That makes it a nice descriptive statistic. It’s easy to
calculate, it’s easy to understand, and it’s easy to compare across students.
But it’s not perfect . The GPA does not reflect the difficulty of the courses that different students
may have taken. How can we compare a student with a 3.4 GPA in classes that appear to be
relatively nonchallenging and a student with a 2.9 GPA who has taken calculus, physics, and other
tough subjects? I went to a high school that attempted to solve this problem by giving extra weight to
difficult classes, so that an A in an “honors” class was worth five points instead of the usual four.
This caused its own problems. My mother was quick to recognize the distortion caused by this GPA
“fix.” For a student taking a lot of honors classes (me), any A in a nonhonors course, such as gym or
health education, would actually pull my GPA down, even though it is impossible to do better than an
A in those classes. As a result, my parents forbade me to take driver’s education in high school, lest
even a perfect performance diminish my chances of getting into a competitive college and going on to
write popular books. Instead, they paid to send me to a private driving school, at nights over the
Was that insane? Yes. But one theme of this book will be that an overreliance on any descriptive
statistic can lead to misleading conclusions, or cause undesirable behavior. My original draft of that
sentence used the phrase “oversimplified descriptive statistic,” but I struck the word
“oversimplified” because it’s redundant. Descriptive statistics exist to simplify, which always
implies some loss of nuance or detail. Anyone working with numbers needs to recognize as much.
How many homeless people live on the streets of Chicago? How often do married people have sex?
These may seem like wildly different kinds of questions; in fact, they both can be answered (not
perfectly) by the use of basic statistical tools. One key function of statistics is to use the data we have
to make informed conjectures about larger questions for which we do not have full information. In
short, we can use data from the “known world” to make informed inferences about the “unknown
Let’s begin with the homeless question. It is expensive and logistically difficult to count the
homeless population in a large metropolitan area. Yet it is important to have a numerical estimate of
this population for purposes of providing social services, earning eligibility for state and federal
revenues, and gaining congressional representation. One important statistical practice is sampling,
which is the process of gathering data for a small area, say, a handful of census tracts, and then using
those data to make an informed judgment, or inference, about the homeless population for the city as a
whole. Sampling requires far less resources than trying to count an entire population; done properly,
it can be every bit as accurate.
A political poll is one form of sampling. A research organization will attempt to contact a sample
of households that are broadly representative of the larger population and ask them their views about
a particular issue or candidate. This is obviously much cheaper and faster than trying to contact every
household in an entire state or country. The polling and research firm Gallup reckons that a
methodologically sound poll of 1,000 households will produce roughly the same results as a poll that
attempted to contact every household in America.
That’s how we figured out how often Americans are having sex, with whom, and what kind. In the
mid-1990s, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago carried out a
remarkably ambitious study of American sexual behavior. The results were based on detailed surveys
conducted in person with a large, representative sample of American adults. If you read on, Chapter
10 will tell you what they learned. How many other statistics books can promise you that?
Assessing Risk and Other Probability-Related Events
Casinos make money in the long run—always. That does not mean that they are making money at any
given moment. When the bells and whistles go off, some high roller has just won thousands of dollars.
The whole gambling industry is built on games of chance, meaning that the outcome of any particular
roll of the dice or turn of the card is uncertain. At the same time, the underlying probabilities for the
relevant events—drawing 21 at blackjack or spinning red in roulette—are known. When the
underlying probabilities favor the casinos (as they always do), we can be increasingly certain that the
“house” is going to come out ahead as the number of bets wagered gets larger and larger, even as
those bells and whistles keep going off.
This turns out to be a powerful phenomenon in areas of life far beyond casinos. Many businesses
must assess the risks associated with assorted adverse outcomes. They cannot make those risks go
away entirely, just as a casino cannot guarantee that you won’t win every hand of blackjack that you
play. However, any business facing uncertainty can manage these risks by engineering processes so
that the probability of an adverse outcome, anything from an environmental catastrophe to a defective
product, becomes acceptably low. Wall Street firms will often evaluate the risks posed to their
portfolios under different scenarios, with each of those scenarios weighted based on its probability.
The financial crisis of 2008 was precipitated in part by a series of market events that had been
deemed extremely unlikely, as if every player in a casino drew blackjack all night. I will argue later
in the book that these Wall Street models were flawed and that the data they used to assess the
underlying risks were too limited, but the point here is that any model to deal with risk must have
probability as its foundation.
When individuals and firms cannot make unacceptable risks go away, they seek protection in other
ways. The entire insurance industry is built upon charging customers to protect them against some
adverse outcome, such as a car crash or a house fire. The insurance industry does not make money by
eliminating these events; cars crash and houses burn every day. Sometimes cars even crash into
houses, causing them to burn. Instead, the insurance industry makes money by charging premiums that
are more than sufficient to pay for the expected payouts from car crashes and house fires. (The
insurance company may also try to lower its expected payouts by encouraging safe driving, fences
around swimming pools, installation of smoke detectors in every bedroom, and so on.)
Probability can even be used to catch cheats in some situations. The firm Caveon Test Security
specializes in what it describes as “data forensics” to find patterns that suggest cheating.5 For
example, the company (which was founded by a former test developer for the SAT) will flag exams at
a school or test site on which the number of identical wrong answers is highly unlikely, usually a
pattern that would happen by chance less than one time in a million. The mathematical logic stems
from the fact that we cannot learn much when a large group of students all answer a question
correctly. That’s what they are supposed to do; they could be cheating, or they could be smart. But
when those same test takers get an answer wrong, they should not all consistently have the same
wrong answer. If they do, it suggests that they are copying from one another (or sharing answers via
text). The company also looks for exams in which a test taker does significantly better on hard
questions than on easy questions (suggesting that he or she had answers in advance) and for exams on
which the number of “wrong to right” erasures is significantly higher than the number of “right to
wrong” erasures (suggesting that a teacher or administrator changed the answer sheets after the test).
Of course, you can see the limitations of using probability. A large group of test takers might have
the same wrong answers by coincidence; in fact, the more schools we evaluate, the more likely it is
that we will observe such patterns just as a matter of chance. A statistical anomaly does not prove
wrongdoing. Delma Kinney, a fifty-year-old Atlanta man, won $1 million in an instant lottery game in
2008 and then another $1 million in an instant game in 2011. 6 The probability of that happening to the
same person is somewhere in the range of 1 in 25 trillion. We cannot arrest Mr. Kinney for fraud on
the basis of that calculation alone (though we might inquire whether he has any relatives who work
for the state lottery). Probability is one weapon in an arsenal that requires good judgment.
Identifying Important Relationships
(Statistical Detective Work)
Does smoking cigarettes cause cancer? We have an answer for that question—but the process of
answering it was not nearly as straightforward as one might think. The scientific method dictates that
if we are testing a scientific hypothesis, we should conduct a controlled experiment in which the
variable of interest (e.g., smoking) is the only thing that differs between the experimental group and
the control group. If we observe a marked difference in some outcome between the two groups (e.g.,
lung cancer), we can safely infer that the variable of interest is what caused that outcome. We cannot
do that kind of experiment on humans. If our working hypothesis is that smoking causes cancer, it
would be unethical to assign recent college graduates to two groups, smokers and nonsmokers, and
then see who has cancer at the twentieth reunion. (We can conduct controlled experiments on humans
when our hypothesis is that a new drug or treatment may improve their health; we cannot knowingly
expose human subjects when we expect an adverse outcome.)*
Now, you might point out that we do not need to conduct an ethically dubious experiment to
observe the effects of smoking. Couldn’t we just skip the whole fancy methodology and compare
cancer rates at the twentieth reunion between those who have smoked since graduation and those who
have not?
No. Smokers and nonsmokers are likely to be different in ways other than their smoking behavior.
For example, smokers may be more likely to have other habits, such as drinking heavily or eating
badly, that cause adverse health outcomes. If the smokers are particularly unhealthy at the twentieth
reunion, we would not know whether to attribute this outcome to smoking or to other unhealthy things
that many smokers happen to do. We would also have a serious problem with the data on which we
are basing our analysis. Smokers who have become seriously ill with cancer are less likely to attend
the twentieth reunion. (The dead smokers definitely won’t show up.) As a result, any analysis of the
health of the attendees at the twentieth reunion (related to smoking or anything else) will be seriously
flawed by the fact that the healthiest members of the class are the most likely to show up. The further
the class gets from graduation, say, a fortieth or a fiftieth reunion, the more serious this bias will be.
We cannot treat humans like laboratory rats. As a result, statistics is a lot like good detective work.
The data yield clues and patterns that can ultimately lead to meaningful conclusions. You have
probably watched one of those impressive police procedural shows like CSI: New York in which
very attractive detectives and forensic experts pore over minute clues—DNA from a cigarette butt,
teeth marks on an apple, a single fiber from a car floor mat—and then use the evidence to catch a
violent criminal. The appeal of the show is that these experts do not have the conventional evidence
used to find the bad guy, such as an eyewitness or a surveillance videotape. So they turn to scientific
inference instead. Statistics does basically the same thing. The data present unorganized clues—the
crime scene. Statistical analysis is the detective work that crafts the raw data into some meaningful
After Chapter 11, you will appreciate the television show I hope to pitch: CSI: Regression
Analysis, which would be only a small departure from those other action-packed police procedurals.
Regression analysis is the tool that enables researchers to isolate a relationship between two
variables, such as smoking and cancer, while holding constant (or “controlling for”) the effects of
other important variables, such as diet, exercise, weight, and so on. When you read in the newspaper
that eating a bran muffin every day will reduce your chances of getting colon cancer, you need not fear
that some unfortunate group of human experimental subjects has been force-fed bran muffins in the
basement of a federal laboratory somewhere while the control group in the next building gets bacon
and eggs. Instead, researchers will gather detailed information on thousands of people, including how
frequently they eat bran muffins, and then use regression analysis to do two crucial things: (1) quantify
the association observed between eating bran muffins and contracting colon cancer (e.g., a
hypothetical finding that people who eat bran muffins have a 9 percent lower incidence of colon
cancer, controlling for other factors that may affect the incidence of the disease); and (2) quantify the
likelihood that the association between bran muffins and a lower rate of colon cancer observed in this
study is merely a coincidence—a quirk in the data for this sample of people—rather than a
meaningful insight about the relationship between diet and health.
Of course, CSI: Regression Analysis will star actors and actresses who are much better looking
than the academics who typically pore over such data. These hotties (all of whom would have PhDs,
despite being only twenty-three years old) would study large data sets and use the latest statistical
tools to answer important social questions: What are the most effective tools for fighting violent
crime? What individuals are most likely to become terrorists? Later in the book we will discuss the
concept of a “statistically significant” finding, which means that the analysis has uncovered an
association between two variables that is not likely to be the product of chance alone. For academic
researchers, this kind of statistical finding is the “smoking gun.” On CSI: Regression Analysis, I
envision a researcher working late at night in the computer lab because of her daytime commitment as
a member of the U.S. Olympic beach volleyball team. When she gets the printout from her statistical
analysis, she sees exactly what she has been looking for: a large and statistically significant
relationship in her data set between some variable that she had hypothesized might be important and
the onset of autism. She must share this breakthrough immediately!
The researcher takes the printout and runs down the hall, slowed somewhat by the fact that she is
wearing high heels and a relatively small, tight black skirt. She finds her male partner, who is
inexplicably fit and tan for a guy who works fourteen hours a day in a basement computer lab, and
shows him the results. He runs his fingers through his neatly trimmed goatee, grabs his Glock 9-mm
pistol from the desk drawer, and slides it into the shoulder holster beneath his $5,000 Hugo Boss suit
(also inexplicable given his starting academic salary of $38,000 a year). Together the regression
analysis experts walk briskly to see their boss, a grizzled veteran who has overcome failed
relationships and a drinking problem . . .
Okay, you don’t have to buy into the television drama to appreciate the importance of this kind of
statistical research. Just about every social challenge that we care about has been informed by the
systematic analysis of large data sets. (In many cases, gathering the relevant data, which is expensive
and time-consuming, plays a crucial role in this process as will be explained in Chapter 7.) I may
have embellished my characters in CSI: Regression Analysis but not the kind of significant questions
they could examine. There is an academic literature on terrorists and suicide bombers—a subject that
would be difficult to study by means of human subjects (or lab rats for that matter). One such book,
What Makes a Terrorist , was written by one of my graduate school statistics professors. The book
draws its conclusions from data gathered on terrorist attacks around the world. A sample finding:
Terrorists are not desperately poor, or poorly educated. The author, Princeton economist Alan
Krueger, concludes, “Terrorists tend to be drawn from well-educated, middle-class or high-income
Why? Well, that exposes one of the limitations of regression analysis. We can isolate a strong
association between two variables by using statistical analysis, but we cannot necessarily explain
why that relationship exists, and in some cases, we cannot know for certain that the relationship is
causal, meaning that a change in one variable is really causing a change in the other. In the case of
terrorism, Professor Krueger hypothesizes that since terrorists are motivated by political goals, those
who are most educated and affluent have the strongest incentive to change society. These individuals
may also be particularly rankled by suppression of freedom, another factor associated with terrorism.
In Krueger’s study, countries with high levels of political repression have more terrorist activity
(holding other factors constant).
This discussion leads me back to the question posed by the chapter title: What is the point? The
point is not to do math, or to dazzle friends and colleagues with advanced statistical techniques. The
point is to learn things that inform our lives.
Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics
Even in the best of circumstances, statistical analysis rarely unveils “the truth.” We are usually
building a circumstantial case based on imperfect data. As a result, there are numerous reasons that
intellectually honest individuals may disagree about statistical results or their implications. At the
most basic level, we may disagree on the question that is being answered. Sports enthusiasts will be
arguing for all eternity over “the best baseball player ever” because there is no objective definition of
“best.” Fancy descriptive statistics can inform this question, but they will never answer it
definitively. As the next chapter will point out, more socially significant questions fall prey to the
same basic challenge. What is happening to the economic health of the American middle class? That
answer depends on how one defines both “middle class” and “economic health.”
There are limits on the data we can gather and the kinds of experiments we can perform. Alan
Krueger’s study of terrorists did not follow thousands of youth over multiple decades to observe
which of them evolved into terrorists. It’s just not possible. Nor can we create two identical nations
—except that one is highly repressive and the other is not—and then compare the number of suicide
bombers that emerge in each. Even when we can conduct large, controlled experiments on human
beings, they are neither easy nor cheap. Researchers did a large-scale study on whether or not prayer
reduces postsurgical complications, which was one of the questions raised earlier in this chapter.
That study cost $2.4 million. (For the results, you’ll have to wait until Chapter 13.)
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously said, “You go to war with the army you have—
not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” Whatever you may think of Rumsfeld
(and the Iraq war that he was explaining), that aphorism applies to research, too. We conduct
statistical analysis using the best data and methodologies and resources available. The approach is
not like addition or long division, in which the correct technique yields the “right” answer and a
computer is always more precise and less fallible than a human. Statistical analysis is more like good
detective work (hence the commercial potential of CSI: Regression Analysis). Smart and honest
people will often disagree about what the data are trying to tell us.
But who says that everyone using statistics is smart or honest? As mentioned, this book began as an
homage to How to Lie with Statistics, which was first published in 1954 and has sold over a million
copies. The reality is that you can lie with statistics. Or you can make inadvertent errors. In either
case, the mathematical precision attached to statistical analysis can dress up some serious nonsense.
This book will walk through many of the most common statistical errors and misrepresentations (so
that you can recognize them, not put them to use).
So, to return to the title chapter, what is the point of learning statistics?
To summarize huge quantities of data.
To make better decisions.
To answer important social questions.
To recognize patterns that can refine how we do everything from selling diapers to catching
To catch cheaters and prosecute criminals.
To evaluate the effectiveness of policies, programs, drugs, medical procedures, and other
And to spot the scoundrels who use these very same powerful tools for nefarious ends.
If you can do all of that while looking great in a Hugo Boss suit or a short black skirt, then you
might also be the next star of CSI: Regression Analysis.
* The Gini index is sometimes multiplied by 100 to make it a whole number. In that case, the United States would have a Gini Index of
* The word “data” has historically been considered plural (e.g., “The data are very encouraging.”) The singular is “datum,” which would
refer to a single data point, such as one person’s response to a single question on a poll. Using the word “data” as a plural noun is a quick
way to signal to anyone who does serious research that you are conversant with statistics. That said, many authorities on grammar and
many publications, such as the New York Times , now accept that “data” can be singular or plural, as the passage that I’ve quoted from
the Times demonstrates.
* This is a gross simplification of the fascinating and complex field of medical ethics.
Descriptive Statistics
Who was the best baseball player of all time?
Let us ponder for a moment two seemingly unrelated questions: (1) What is happening to the
economic health of America’s middle class? and (2) Who was the greatest baseball player of all
The first question is profoundly important. It tends to be at the core of presidential campaigns and
other social movements. The middle class is the heart of America, so the economic well-being of that
group is a crucial indicator of the nation’s overall economic health. The second question is trivial (in
the literal sense of the word), but baseball enthusiasts can argue about it endlessly. What the two
questions have in common is that they can be used to illustrate the strengths and limitations of
descriptive statistics, which are the numbers and calculations we use to summarize raw data.
If I want to demonstrate that Derek Jeter is a great baseball player, I can sit you down and describe
every at bat in every Major League game that he’s played. That would be raw data, and it would take
a while to digest, given that Jeter has played seventeen seasons with the New York Yankees and
taken 9,868 at bats.
Or I can just tell you that at the end of the 2011 season Derek Jeter had a career batting average of
.313. That is a descriptive statistic, or a “summary statistic.”
The batting average is a gross simplification of Jeter’s seventeen seasons. It is easy to understand,
elegant in its simplicity—and limited in what it can tell us. Baseball experts have a bevy of
descriptive statistics that they consider to be more valuable than the batting average. I called Steve
Moyer, president of Baseball Info Solutions (a firm that provides a lot of the raw data for the
Moneyball types), to ask him, (1) What are the most important statistics for evaluating baseball
talent? and (2) Who was the greatest player of all time? I’ll share his answer once we have more
Meanwhile, let’s return to the less trivial subject, the economic health of the middle class. Ideally
we would like to find the economic equivalent of a batting average, or something even better. We
would like a simple but accurate measure of how the economic well-being of the typical American
worker has been changing in recent years. Are the people we define as middle class getting richer,
poorer, or just running in place? A reasonable answer—though by no means the “right” answer—
would be to calculate the change in per capita income in the United States over the course of a
generation, which is roughly thirty years. Per capita income is a simple average: total income divided
by the size of the population. By that measure, average income in the United States climbed from
$7,787 in 1980 to $26,487 in 2010 (the latest year for which the government has data).1 Voilà!
Congratulations to us.
There is just one problem. My quick calculation is technically correct and yet totally wrong in
terms of the question I set out to answer. To begin with, the figures above are not adjusted for
inflation. (A per capita income of $7,787 in 1980 is equal to about $19,600 when converted to 2010
dollars.) That’s a relatively quick fix. The bigger problem is that the average income in America is
not equal to the income of the average American. Let’s unpack that clever little phrase.
Per capita income merely takes all of the income earned in the country and divides by the number
of people, which tells us absolutely nothing about who is earning how much of that income—in 1980
or in 2010. As the Occupy Wall Street folks would point out, explosive growth in the incomes of the
top 1 percent can raise per capita income significantly without putting any more money in the pockets
of the other 99 percent. In other words, average income can go up without helping the average
As with the baseball statistic query, I have sought outside expertise on how we ought to measure
the health of the American middle class. I asked two prominent labor economists, including President
Obama’s top economic adviser, what descriptive statistics they would use to assess the economic
well-being of a typical American. Yes, you will get that answer, too, once we’ve taken a quick tour
of descriptive statistics to give it more meaning.
From baseball to income, the most basic task when working with data is to summarize a great deal
of information. There are some 330 million residents in the United States. A spreadsheet with the
name and income history of every American would contain all the information we could ever want
about the economic health of the country—yet it would also be so unwieldy as to tell us nothing at all.
The irony is that more data can often present less clarity. So we simplify. We perform calculations
that reduce a complex array of data into a handful of numbers that describe those data, just as we
might encapsulate a complex, multifaceted Olympic gymnastics performance with one number: 9.8.
The good news is that these descriptive statistics give us a manageable and meaningful summary of
the underlying phenomenon. That’s what this chapter is about. The bad news is that any simplification
invites abuse. Descriptive statistics can be like online dating profiles: technically accurate and yet
pretty darn misleading.
Suppose you are at work, idly surfing the Web when you stumble across a riveting day-by-day
account of Kim Kardashian’s failed seventy-two-day marriage to professional basketball player Kris
Humphries. You have finished reading about day seven of the marriage when your boss shows up
with two enormous files of data. One file has warranty claim information for each of the 57,334 laser
printers that your firm sold last year. (For each printer sold, the file documents the number of quality
problems that were reported during the warranty period.) The other file has the same information for
each of the 994,773 laser printers that your chief competitor sold during the same stretch. Your boss
wants to know how your firm’s printers compare in terms of quality with the competition.
Fortunately the computer you’ve been using to read about the Kardashian marriage has a basics
statistics package, but where do you begin? Your instincts are probably correct: The first descriptive
task is often to find some measure of the “middle” of a set of data, or what statisticians might describe
as its “central tendency.” What is the typical quality experience for your printers compared with those
of the competition? The most basic measure of the “middle” of a distribution is the mean, or average.
In this case, we want to know the average number of quality problems per printer sold for your firm
and for your competitor. You would simply tally the total number of quality problems reported for all
printers during the warranty period and then divide by the total number of printers sold. (Remember,
the same printer can have multiple problems while under warranty.) You would do that for each firm,
creating an important descriptive statistic: the average number of quality problems per printer sold.
Suppose it turns out that your competitor’s printers have an average of 2.8 quality-related problems
per printer during the warranty period compared with your firm’s average of 9.1 reported defects.
That was easy. You’ve just taken information on a million printers sold by two different companies
and distilled it to the essence of the problem: your printers break a lot. Clearly it’s time to send a
short e-mail to your boss quantifying this quality gap and then get back to day eight of Kim
Kardashian’s marriage.
Or maybe not. I was deliberately vague earlier when I referred to the “middle” of a distribution.
The mean, or average, turns out to have some problems in that regard, namely, that it is prone to
distortion by “outliers,” which are observations that lie farther from the center. To get your mind
around this concept, imagine that ten guys are sitting on bar stools in a middle-class drinking
establishment in Seattle; each of these guys earns $35,000 a year, which makes the mean annual
income for the group $35,000. Bill Gates walks into the bar with a talking parrot perched on his
shoulder. (The parrot has nothing to do with the example, but it kind of spices things up.) Let’s
assume for the sake of the example that Bill Gates has an annual income of $1 billion. When Bill sits
down on the eleventh bar stool, the mean annual income for the bar patrons rises to about $91 million.
Obviously none of the original ten drinkers is any richer (though it might be reasonable to expect Bill
Gates to buy a round or two). If I were to describe the patrons of this bar as having an average annual
income of $91 million, the statement would be both statistically correct and grossly misleading. This
isn’t a bar where multimillionaires hang out; it’s a bar where a bunch of guys with relatively low
incomes happen to be sitting next to Bill Gates and his talking parrot. The sensitivity of the mean to
outliers is why we should not gauge the economic health of the American middle class by looking at
per capita income. Because there has been explosive growth in incomes at the top end of the
distribution—CEOs, hedge fund managers, and athletes like Derek Jeter—the average income in the
United States could be heavily skewed by the megarich, making it look a lot like the bar stools with
Bill Gates at the end.
For this reason, we have another statistic that also signals the “middle” of a distribution, albeit
differently: the median. The median is the point that divides a distribution in half, meaning that half of
the observations lie above the median and half lie below. (If there is an even number of observations,
the median is the midpoint between the two middle observations.) If we return to the bar stool
example, the median annual income for the ten guys originally sitting in the bar is $35,000. When Bill
Gates walks in with his parrot and perches on a stool, the median annual income for the eleven of
them is still $35,000. If you literally envision lining up the bar patrons on stools in ascending order of
their incomes, the income of the guy sitting on the sixth stool represents the median income for the
group. If Warren Buffett comes in and sits down on the twelfth stool next to Bill Gates, the median
still does not change.*
For distributions without serious outliers, the median and the mean will be similar. I’ve included a
hypothetical summary of the quality data for the competitor’s printers. In particular, I’ve laid out the
data in what is known as a frequency distribution. The number of quality problems per printer is
arrayed along the bottom; the height of each bar represents the percentages of printers sold with that
number of quality problems. For example, 36 percent of the competitor’s printers had two quality
defects during the warranty period. Because the distribution includes all possible quality outcomes,
including zero defects, the proportions must sum to 1 (or 100 percent).
Frequency Distribution of Quality Complaints for Competitor’s Printers
Because the distribution is nearly symmetrical, the mean and median are relatively close to one
another. The distribution is slightly skewed to the right by the small number of printers with many
reported quality defects. These outliers move the mean slightly rightward but have no impact on the
median. Suppose that just before you dash off the quality report to your boss you decide to calculate
the median number of quality problems for your firm’s printers and the competition’s. With a few
keystrokes, you get the result. The median number of quality complaints for the competitor’s printers
is 2; the median number of quality complaints for your company’s printers is 1.
Huh? Your firm’s median number of quality complaints per printer is actually lower than your
competitor’s. Because the Kardashian marriage is getting monotonous, and because you are intrigued
by this finding, you print a frequency distribution for your own quality problems.
Frequency Distribution of Quality Complaints at Your Company
What becomes clear is that your firm does not have a uniform quality problem; you have a “lemon”
problem; a small number of printers have a huge number of quality complaints. These outliers inflate
the mean but not the median. More important from a production standpoint, you do not need to retool
the whole manufacturing process; you need only figure out where the egregiously low-quality printers
are coming from and fix that.*
Neither the median nor the mean is hard to calculate; the key is determining which measure of the
“middle” is more accurate in a particular situation (a phenomenon that is easily exploited).
Meanwhile, the median has some useful relatives. As we’ve already discussed, the median divides a
distribution in half. The distribution can be further divided into quarters, or quartiles. The first
quartile consists of the bottom 25 percent of the observations; the second quartile consists of the next
25 percent of the observations; and so on. Or the distribution can be divided into deciles, each with
10 percent of the observations. (If your income is in the top decile of the American income
distribution, you would be earning more than 90 percent of your fellow workers.) We can go even
further and divide the distribution into hundredths, or percentiles. Each percentile represents 1
percent of the distribution, so that the 1st percentile represents the bottom 1 percent of the distribution
and the 99th percentile represents the top 1 percent of the distribution.
The benefit of these kinds of descriptive statistics is that they describe where a particular
observation lies compared with everyone else. If I tell you that your child scored in the 3rd percentile
on a reading comprehension test, you should know immediately that the family should be logging more
time at the library. You don’t need to know anything about the test itself, or the number of questions
that your child got correct. The percentile score provides a ranking of your child’s score relative to
that of all the other test takers. If the test was easy, then most test takers will have a high number of
answers correct, but your child will have fewer correct than most of the others. If the test was
extremely difficult, then all the test takers will have a low number of correct answers, but your
child’s score will be lower still.
Here is a good point to introduce some useful terminology. An “absolute” score, number, or figure
has some intrinsic meaning. If I shoot 83 for eighteen holes of golf, that is an absolute figure. I may do
that on a day that is 58 degrees, which is also an absolute figure. Absolute figures can usually be
interpreted without any context or additional information. When I tell you that I shot 83, you don’t
need to know what other golfers shot that day in order to evaluate my performance. (The exception
might be if the conditions are particularly awful, or if the course is especially difficult or easy.) If I
place ninth in the golf tournament, that is a relative statistic. A “relative” value or figure has meaning
only in comparison to something else, or in some broader context, such as compared with the eight
golfers who shot better than I did. Most standardized tests produce results that have meaning only as a
relative statistic. If I tell you that a third grader in an Illinois elementary school scored 43 out of 60
on the mathematics portion of the Illinois State Achievement Test, that absolute score doesn’t have
much meaning. But when I convert it to a percentile—meaning that I put that raw score into a
distribution with the math scores for all other Illinois third graders—then it acquires a great deal of
meaning. If 43 correct answers falls into the 83rd percentile, then this student is doing better than
most of his peers statewide. If he’s in the 8th percentile, then he’s really struggling. In this case, the
percentile (the relative score) is more meaningful than the number of correct answers (the absolute
Another statistic that can help us describe what might otherwise be a jumble of numbers is the
standard deviation, which is a measure of how dispersed the data are from their mean. In other
words, how spread out are the observations? Suppose I collected data on the weights of 250 people
on an airplane headed for Boston, and I also collected the weights of a sample of 250 qualifiers for
the Boston Marathon. Now assume that the mean weight for both groups is roughly the same, say 155
pounds. Anyone who has been squeezed into a row on a crowded flight, fighting for the armrest,
knows that many people on a typical commercial flight weigh more than 155 pounds. But you may
recall from those same unpleasant, overcrowded flights that there were lots of crying babies and
poorly behaved children, all of whom have enormous lung capacity but not much mass. When it
comes to calculating the average weight on the flight, the heft of the 320-pound football players on
either side of your middle seat is likely offset by the tiny screaming infant across the row and the sixyear-old kicking the back of your seat from the row behind.
On the basis of the descriptive tools introduced so far, the weights of the airline passengers and the
marathoners are nearly identical. But they’re not. Yes, the weights of the two groups have roughly the
same “middle,” but the airline passengers have far more dispersion around that midpoint, meaning
that their weights are spread farther from the midpoint. My eight-year-old son might point out that the
marathon runners look like they all weigh the same amount, while the airline passengers have some
tiny people and some bizarrely large people. The weights of the airline passengers are “more spread
out,” which is an important attribute when it comes to describing the weights of these two groups. The
standard deviation is the descriptive statistic that allows us to assign a single number to this
dispersion around the mean. The formulas for calculating the standard deviation and the variance
(another common measure of dispersion from which the standard deviation is derived) are included
in an appendix at the end of the chapter. For now, let’s think about why the measuring of dispersion
Suppose you walk into the doctor’s office. You’ve been feeling fatigued ever since your promotion
to head of North American printer quality. Your doctor draws blood, and a few days later her
assistant leaves a message on your answering machine to inform you that your HCb2 count (a
fictitious blood chemical) is 134. You rush to the Internet and discover that the mean HCb2 count for
a person your age is 122 (and the median is about the same). Holy crap! If you’re like me, you would
finally draft a will. You’d write tearful letters to your parents, spouse, children, and close friends.
You might take up skydiving or try to write a novel very fast. You would send your boss a hastily
composed e-mail comparing him to a certain part of the human anatomy—IN ALL CAPS.
None of these things may be necessary (and the e-mail to your boss could turn out very badly).
When you call the doctor’s office back to arrange for your hospice care, the physician’s assistant
informs you that your count is within the normal range. But how could that be? “My count is 12 points
higher than average!” you yell repeatedly into the receiver.
“The standard deviation for the HCb2 count is 18,” the technician informs you curtly.
What the heck does that mean?
There is natural variation in the HCb2 count, as there is with most biological phenomena (e.g.,
height). While the mean count for the fake chemical might be 122, plenty of healthy people have
counts that are higher or lower. The danger arises only when the HCb2 count gets excessively high or
low. So how do we figure out what “excessively” means in this context? As we’ve already noted, the
standard deviation is a measure of dispersion, meaning that it reflects how tightly the observations
cluster around the mean. For many typical distributions of data, a high proportion of the observations
lie within one standard deviation of the mean (meaning that they are in the range from one standard
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean). To illustrate with a simple
example, the mean height for American adult men is 5 feet 10 inches. The standard deviation is
roughly 3 inches. A high proportion of adult men are between 5 feet 7 inches and 6 feet 1 inch.
Or, to put it slightly differently, any man in this height range would not be considered abnormally
short or tall. Which brings us back to your troubling HCb2 results. Yes, your count is 12 above the
mean, but that’s less than one standard deviation, which is the blood chemical equivalent of being
about 6 feet tall—not particularly unusual. Of course, far fewer observations lie two standard
deviations from the mean, and fewer still lie three or four standard deviations away. (In the case of
height, an American man who is three standard deviations above average in height would be 6 feet 7
inches or taller.)
Some distributions are more dispersed than others. Hence, the standard deviation of the weights of
the 250 airline passengers will be higher than the standard deviation of the weights of the 250
marathon runners. A frequency distribution with the weights of the airline passengers would literally
be fatter (more spread out) than a frequency distribution of the weights of the marathon runners. Once
we know the mean and standard deviation for any collection of data, we have some serious
intellectual traction. For example, suppose I tell you that the mean score on the SAT math test is 500
with a standard deviation of 100. As with height, the bulk of students taking the test will be within one
standard deviation of the mean, or between 400 and 600. How many students do you think score 720
or higher? Probably not very many, since that is more than two standard deviations above the mean.
In fact, we can do even better than “not very many.” This is a good time to introduce one of the
most important, helpful, and common distributions in statistics: the normal distribution. Data that are
distributed normally are symmetrical around their mean in a bell shape that will look familiar to you.
The normal distribution describes many common phenomena. Imagine a frequency distribution
describing popcorn popping on a stove top. Some kernels start to pop early, maybe one or two pops
per second; after ten or fifteen seconds, the kernels are exploding frenetically. Then gradually the
number of kernels popping per second fades away at roughly the same rate at which the popping
began. The heights of American men are distributed more or less normally, meaning that they are
roughly symmetrical around the mean of 5 feet 10 inches. Each SAT test is specifically designed to
produce a normal distribution of scores with mean 500 and standard deviation of 100. According to
the Wall Street Journal, Americans even tend to park in a normal distribution at shopping malls; most
cars park directly opposite the mall entrance—the “peak” of the normal curve—with “tails” of cars
going off to the right and left of the entrance.
The beauty of the normal distribution—its Michael Jordan power, finesse, and elegance—comes
from the fact that we know by definition exactly what proportion of the observations in a normal
distribution lie within one standard deviation of the mean (68.2 percent), within two standard
deviations of the mean (95.4 percent), within three standard deviations (99.7 percent), and so on.
This may sound like trivia. In fact, it is the foundation on which much of statistics is built. We will
come back to this point in much great depth later in the book.
The Normal Distribution
The mean is the middle line which is often represented by the Greek letter µ. The standard
deviation is often represented by the Greek letter σ. Each band represents one standard deviation.
Descriptive statistics are often used to compare two figures or quantities. I’m one inch taller than my
brother; today’s temperature is nine degrees above the historical average for this date; and so on.
Those comparisons make sense because most of us recognize the scale of the units involved. One inch
does not amount to much when it comes to a person’s height, so you can infer that my brother and I are
roughly the same height. Conversely, nine degrees is a significant temperature deviation in just about
any climate at any time of year, so nine degrees above average makes for a day that is much hotter
than usual. But suppose that I told you that Granola Cereal A contains 31 milligrams more sodium
than Granola Cereal B. Unless you know an awful lot about sodium (and the serving sizes for granola
cereal), that statement is not going to be particularly informative. Or what if I told you that my cousin
Al earned $53,000 less this year than last year? Should we be worried about Al? Or is he a hedge
fund manager for whom $53,000 is a rounding error in his annual compensation?
In both the sodium and the income examples, we’re missing context. The easiest way to give
meaning to these relative comparisons is by using percentages. It would mean something if I told you
that Granola Bar A has 50 percent more sodium than Granola Bar B, or that Uncle Al’s income fell
47 percent last year. Measuring change as a percentage gives us some sense of scale.
You probably learned how to calculate percentages in fourth grade and will be tempted to skip the
next few paragraphs. Fair enough. But first do one simple exercise for me. Assume that a department
store is selling a dress for $100. The assistant manager marks down all merchandise by 25 percent.
But then that assistant manager is fired for hanging out in a bar with Bill Gates,* and the new assistant
manager raises all prices by 25 percent. What is the final price of the dress? If you said (or thought)
$100, then you had better not skip any paragraphs.
The final price of the dress is actually $93.75. This is not merely a fun parlor trick that will win
you applause and adulation at cocktail parties. Percentages are useful—but also potentially confusing
or even deceptive. The formula for calculating a percentage difference (or change) is the following:
(new figure – original figure)/original figure. The numerator (the part on the top of the fraction) gives
us the size of the change in absolute terms; the denominator (the bottom of the fraction) is what puts
this change in context by comparing it with our starting point. At first, this seems straightforward, as
when the assistant store manager cuts the price of the $100 dress by 25 percent. Twenty-five percent
of the original $100 price is $25; that’s the discount, which takes the price down to $75. You can plug
the numbers into the formula above and do some simple manipulation to get to the same place: ($100
– $75)/$100 = .25, or 25 percent.
The dress is selling for $75 when the new assistant manager demands that the price be raised 25
percent. That’s where many of the people reading this paragraph probably made a mistake. The 25
percent markup is calculated as a percentage of the dress’s new reduced price, which is $75. The
increase will be .25($75), or $18.75, which is how the final price ends up at $93.75 (and not $100).
The point is that a percentage change always gives the value of some figure relative to something
else. Therefore, we had better understand what that something else is.
I once invested some money in a company that my college roommate started. Since it was a private
venture, there were no requirements as to what information had to be provided to shareholders. A
number of years went by without any information on the fate of my investment; my former roommate
was fairly tight-lipped on the subject. Finally, I received a letter in the mail informing me that the
firm’s profits were 46 percent higher than the year before. There was no information on the size of
those profits in absolute terms, meaning that I still had absolutely no idea how my investment was
performing. Suppose that last year the firm earned 27 cents—essentially nothing. This year the firm
earned 39 cents—also essentially nothing. Yet the company’s profits grew from 27 cents to 39 cents,
which is technically a 46 percent increase. Obviously the shareholder letter would have been more of
a downer if it pointed out that the firm’s cumulative profits over two years were less than the cost of a
cup of Starbucks coffee.
To be fair to my roommate, he eventually sold the company for hundreds of millions of dollars,
earning me a 100 percent return on my investment. (Since you have no idea how much I invested, you
also have no idea how much money I made—which reinforces my point here very nicely!)
Let me make one additional distinction. Percentage change must not be confused with a change in
percentage points. Rates are often expressed in percentages. The sales tax rate in Illinois is 6.75
percent. I pay my agent 15 percent of my book royalties. These rates are levied against some quantity,
such as income in the case of the income tax rate. Obviously the rates can go up or down; less
intuitively, the changes in the rates can be described in vastly dissimilar ways. The best example of
this was a recent change in the Illinois personal income tax, which was raised from 3 percent to 5
percent. There are two ways to express this tax change, both of which are technically accurate. The
Democrats, who engineered this tax increase, pointed out (correctly) that the state income tax rate
was increased by 2 percentage points (from 3 percent to 5 percent). The Republicans pointed out
(also correctly) that the state income tax had been raised by 67 percent. [This is a handy test of the
formula from a few paragraphs back: (5 – 3)/3 = 2/3, which rounds up to 67 percent.]
The Democrats focused on the absolute change in the tax rate; Republicans focused on the
percentage change in the tax burden. As noted, both descriptions are technically correct, though I
would argue that the Republican description more accurately conveys the impact of the tax change,
since what I’m going to have to pay to the government—the amount that I care about, as opposed to
the way it is calculated—really has gone up by 67 percent.
Many phenomena defy perfect description with a single statistic. Suppose quarterback Aaron Rodgers
throws for 365 yards but no touchdowns. Meanwhile, Peyton Manning throws for a meager 127 yards
but three touchdowns. Manning generated more points, but presumably Rodgers set up touchdowns by
marching his team down the field and keeping the other team’s offense off the field. Who played
better? In Chapter 1, I discussed the NFL passer rating, which is the league’s reasonable attempt to
deal with this statistical challenge. The passer rating is an example of an index, which is a
descriptive statistic made up of other descriptive statistics. Once these different measures of
performance are consolidated into a single number, that statistic can be used to make comparisons,
such as ranking quarterbacks on a particular day, or even over a whole career. If baseball had a
similar index, then the question of the best player ever would be solved. Or would it?
The advantage of any index is that it consolidates lots of complex information into a single number.
We can then rank things that otherwise defy simple comparison—anything from quarterbacks to
colleges to beauty pageant contestants. In the Miss America pageant, the overall winner is a
combination of five separate competitions: personal interview, swimsuit, evening wear, talent, and
onstage question. (Miss Congeniality is voted on separately by the participants themselves.)
Alas, the disadvantage of any index is that it consolidates lots of complex information into a single
number. There are countless ways to do that; each has the potential to produce a different outcome.
Malcolm Gladwell makes this point brilliantly in a New Yorker piece critiquing our compelling need
to rank things.2 (He comes down particularly hard on the college rankings.) Gladwell offers the
example of Car and Driver’s ranking of three sports cars: the Porsche Cayman, the Chevrolet
Corvette, and the Lotus Evora. Using a formula that includes twenty-one different variables, Car and
Driver ranked the Porsche number one. But Gladwell points out that “exterior styling” counts for only
4 percent of the total score in the Car and Driver formula, which seems ridiculously low for a sports
car. If styling is given more weight in the overall ranking (25 percent), then the Lotus comes out on
But wait. Gladwell also points out that the sticker price of the car gets relatively little weight in the
Car and Driver formula. If value is weighted more heavily (so that the ranking is based equally on
price, exterior styling, and vehicle characteristics), the Chevy Corvette is ranked number one.
Any index is highly sensitive to the descriptive statistics that are cobbled together to build it, and
to the weight given to each of those components. As a result, indices range from useful but imperfect
tools to complete charades. An example of the former is the United Nations Human Development
Index, or HDI. The HDI was created as a measure of economic well-being that is broader than
income alone. The HDI uses income as one of its components but also includes measures of life
expectancy and educational attainment. The United States ranks eleventh in the world in terms of per
capita economic output (behind several oil-rich nations like Qatar, Brunei, and Kuwait) but fourth in
the world in human development.3 It’s true that the HDI rankings would change slightly if the
component parts of the index were reconfigured, but no reasonable change is going to make
Zimbabwe zoom up the rankings past Norway. The HDI provides a handy and reasonably accurate
snapshot of living standards around the globe.
Descriptive statistics give us insight into phenomena that we care about. In that spirit, we can return
to the questions posed at the beginning of the chapter. Who is the best baseball player of all time?
More important for the purposes of this chapter, what descriptive statistics would be most helpful in
answering that question? According to Steve Moyer, president of Baseball Info Solutions, the three
most valuable statistics (other than age) for evaluating any player who is not a pitcher would be the
1. On-base percentage (OBP), sometimes called the on-base average (OBA): Measures the
proportion of the time that a player reaches base successfully, including walks (which are not
counted in the batting average).
2. Slugging percentage (SLG): Measures power hitting by calculating the total bases reached per
at bat. A single counts as 1, a double is 2, a triple is 3, and a home run is 4. Thus, a batter who
hit a single and a triple in five at bats would have a slugging percentage of (1 + 3)/5, or .800.
3. At bats (AB): Puts the above in context. Any mope can have impressive statistics for a game or
two. A superstar compiles impressive “numbers” over thousands of plate appearances.
In Moyer’s view (without hesitation, I might add), the best baseball player of all time was Babe Ruth
because of his unique ability to hit and to pitch. Babe Ruth still holds the Major League career record
for slugging percentage at .690.4
What about the economic health of the American middle class? Again, I deferred to the experts. I emailed Jeff Grogger (a colleague of mine at the University of Chicago) and Alan Krueger (the same
Princeton economist who studied terrorists and is now serving as chair of President Obama’s Council
of Economic Advisers). Both gave variations on the same basic answer. To assess the economic
health of America’s “middle class,” we should examine changes in the median wage (adjusted for
inflation) over the last several decades. They also recommended examining changes to wages at the
25th and 75th percentiles (which can reasonably be interpreted as the upper and lower bounds for the
middle class).
One more distinction is in order. When assessing economic health, we can examine income or
wages. They are not the same thing. A wage is what we are paid for some fixed amount of labor, such
as an hourly or weekly wage. Income is the sum of all payments from different sources. If workers
take a second job or work more hours, their income can go up without a change in the wage. (For that
matter, income can go up even if the wage is falling, provided a worker logs enough hours on the
job.) However, if individuals have to work more in order to earn more, it’s hard to evaluate the
overall effect on their well-being. The wage is a less ambiguous measure of how Americans are
being compensated for the work they do; the higher the wage, the more workers take home for every
hour on the job.
Having said all that, here is a graph of American wages over the past three decades. I’ve also
added the 90th percentile to illustrate changes in the wages for middle-class workers compared over
this time frame to those workers at the top of the distribution.
Source: “Changes in the Distribution of Workers’ Hourly Wages between 1979 and 2009,” Congressional Budget Office, February 16,
2011. The data for the chart can be found at
A variety of conclusions can be drawn from these data. They do not present a single “right” answer
with regard to the economic fortunes of the middle class. They do tell us that the typical worker, an
American worker earning the median wage, has been “running in place” for nearly thirty years.
Workers at the 90th percentile have done much, much better. Descriptive statistics help to frame the
issue. What we do about it, if anything, is an ideological and political question.
Data for the printer defects graphics
Formula for variance and standard deviation
Variance and standard deviation are the most common statistical mechanisms for measuring and
describing the dispersion of a distribution. The variance, which is often represented by the symbol σ2,
is calculated by determining how far the observations within a distribution lie from the mean.
However, the twist is that the difference between each observation and the mean is squared; the sum
of those squared terms is then divided by the number of observations.
Because the difference between each term and the mean is squared, the formula for calculating
variance puts particular weight on observations that lie far from the mean, or outliers, as the
following table of student heights illustrates.
* Absolute value is the distance between two figures, regardless of direction, so that it is always positive. In this case, it represents the
number of inches between the height of the individual and the mean.
Both groups of students have a mean height of 70 inches. The heights of students in both groups
also differ from the mean by the same number of total inches: 14. By that measure of dispersion, the
two distributions are identical. However, the variance for Group 2 is higher because of the weight
given in the variance formula to values that lie particularly far from the mean—Sahar and Narciso in
this case.
Variance is rarely used as a descriptive statistic on its own. Instead, the variance is most useful as
a step toward calculating the standard deviation of a distribution, which is a more intuitive tool as a
descriptive statistic.
The standard deviation for a set of observations is the square root of the variance:
For any set of n observations x1, x2, x3 . . . xn with mean µ,
standard deviation = σ = square root of this whole quantity =
* With twelve bar patrons, the median would be the midpoint between the income of the guy on the sixth stool and the income of the guy
on the seventh stool. Since they both make $35,000, the median is $35,000. If one made $35,000 and the other made $36,000, the median
for the whole group would be $35,500.
* Manufacturing update: It turns out that nearly all of the defective printers were being manufactured at a plant in Kentucky where
workers had stripped parts off the assembly line in order to build a bourbon distillery. Both the perpetually drunk employees and the
random missing pieces on the assembly line appear to have compromised the quality of the printers being produced there.
* Remarkably, this person was one of the ten people with annual incomes of $35,000 who were sitting on bar stools when Bill Gates
walked in with his parrot. Go figure!
Deceptive Description
“He’s got a great personality!” and other
true but grossly misleading statements
To anyone who has ever contemplated dating, the phrase “he’s got a great personality” usually sets
off alarm bells, not because the description is necessarily wrong, but for what it may not reveal, such
as the fact that the guy has a prison record or that his divorce is “not entirely final.” We don’t doubt
that this guy has a great personality; we are wary that a true statement, the great personality, is being
used to mask or obscure other information in a way that is seriously misleading (assuming that most of
us would prefer not to date ex-felons who are still married). The statement is not a lie per se, meaning
that it wouldn’t get you convicted of perjury, but it still could be so inaccurate as to be untruthful.
And so it is with statistics. Although the field of statistics is rooted in mathematics, and
mathematics is exact, the use of statistics to describe complex phenomena is not exact. That leaves
plenty of room for shading the truth. Mark Twain famously remarked that there are three kinds of lies:
lies, damned lies, and statistics.* As the last chapter explained, most phenomena that we care about
can be described in multiple ways. Once there are multiple ways of describing the same thing (e.g.,
“he’s got a great personality” or “he was convicted of securities fraud”), the descriptive statistics that
we choose to use (or not to use) will have a profound impact on the impression that we leave.
Someone with nefarious motives can use perfectly good facts and figures to support entirely
disputable or illegitimate conclusions.
We ought to begin with the crucial distinction between “precision” and “accuracy.” These words
are not interchangeable. Precision reflects the exactitude with which we can express something. In a
description of the length of your commute, “41.6 miles” is more precise than “about 40 miles,” which
is more precise than “a long f——ing way.” If you ask me how far it is to the nearest gas station, and
I tell you that it’s 1.265 miles to the east, that’s a precise answer. Here is the problem: That answer
may be entirely inaccurate if the gas station happens to be in the other direction. On the other hand, if I
tell you, “Drive ten minutes or so until you see a hot dog stand. The gas station will be a couple
hundred yards after that on the right. If you pass the Hooters, you’ve gone too far,” my answer is less
precise than “1.265 miles to the east” but significantly better because I am sending you in the
direction of the gas station. Accuracy is a measure of whether a figure is broadly consistent with the
truth—hence the danger of confusing precision with accuracy. If an answer is accurate, then more
precision is usually better. But no amount of precision can make up for inaccuracy.
In fact, precision can mask inaccuracy by giving us a false sense of certainty, either inadvertently
or quite deliberately. Joseph McCarthy, the Red-baiting senator from Wisconsin, reached the apogee
of his reckless charges in 1950 when he alleged not only that the U.S. State Department was
infiltrated with communists, but that he had a list of their names. During a speech in Wheeling, West
Virginia, McCarthy waved in the air a piece of paper and declared, “I have here in my hand a list of
205—a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the
Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State
Department.”1 It turns out that the paper had no names on it at all, but the specificity of the charge
gave it credibility, despite the fact that it was a bald-faced lie.
I learned the important distinction between precision and accuracy in a less malicious context. For
Christmas one year my wife bought me a golf range finder to calculate distances on the course from
my golf ball to the hole. The device works with some kind of laser; I stand next to my ball in the
fairway (or rough) and point the range finder at the flag on the green, at which point the device
calculates the exact distance that I’m supposed to hit the ball. This is an improvement upon the
standard yardage markers, which give distances only to the center of the green (and are therefore
accurate but less precise). With my Christmas-gift range finder I was able to know that I was 147.2
yards from the hole. I expected the precision of this nifty technology to improve my golf game.
Instead, it got appreciably worse.
There were two problems. First, I used the stupid device for three months before I realized that it
was set to meters rather than to yards; every seemingly precise calculation (147.2) was wrong.
Second, I would sometimes inadvertently aim the laser beam at the trees behind the green, rather than
at the flag marking the hole, so that my “perfect” shot would go exactly the distance it was supposed
to go—right over the green into the forest. The lesson for me, which applies to all statistical analysis,
is that even the most precise measurements or calculations should be checked against common sense.
To take an example with more serious implications, many of the Wall Street risk management
models prior to the 2008 financial crisis were quite precise. The concept of “value at risk” allowed
firms to quantify with precision the amount of the firm’s capital that could be lost under different
scenarios. The problem was that the supersophisticated models were the equivalent of setting my
range finder to meters rather than to yards. The math was complex and arcane. The answers it
produced were reassuringly precise. But the assumptions about what might happen to global markets
that were embedded in the models were just plain wrong, making the conclusions wholly inaccurate
in ways that destabilized not only Wall Street but the entire global economy.
Even the most precise and accurate descriptive statistics can suffer from a more fundamental
problem: a lack of clarity over what exactly we are trying to define, describe, or explain. Statistical
arguments have much in common with bad marriages; the disputants often talk past one another.
Consider an important economic question: How healthy is American manufacturing? One often hears
that American manufacturing jobs are being lost in huge numbers to China, India, and other low-wage
countries. One also hears that high-tech manufacturing still thrives in the United States and that
America remains one of the world’s top exporters of manufactured goods. Which is it? This would
appear to be a case in which sound analysis of good data could reconcile these competing narratives.
Is U.S. manufacturing profitable and globally competitive, or is it shrinking in the face of intense
foreign competition?
Both. The British news magazine the Economist reconciled the two seemingly contradictory views
of American manufacturing with the following graph.
“The Rustbelt Recovery,” March 10, 2011
The seeming contradiction lies in how one defines the “health” of U.S. manufacturing. In terms of
output—the total value of goods produced and sold—the U.S. manufacturing sector grew steadily in
the 2000s, took a big hit during the Great Recession, and has since bounced back robustly. This is
consistent with data from the CIA’s World Factbook showing that the United States is the thirdlargest manufacturing exporter in the world, behind China and Germany. The United States remains a
manufacturing powerhouse.
But the graph in the Economist has a second line, which is manufacturing employment. The number
of manufacturing jobs in the United States has fallen steadily; roughly six million manufacturing jobs
were lost in the last decade. Together, these two stories—rising manufacturing output and falling
employment—tell the complete story. Manufacturing in the United States has grown steadily more
productive, meaning that factories are producing more output with fewer workers. This is good from
a global competitiveness standpoint, for it makes American products more competitive with
manufactured goods from low-wage countries. (One way to compete with a firm that can pay workers
$2 an hour is to create a manufacturing process so efficient that one worker earning $40 can do twenty
times as much.) But there are a lot fewer manufacturing jobs , which is terrible news for the
displaced workers who depended on those wages.
Since this is a book about statistics and not manufacturing, let’s go back to the main point, which is
that the “health” of U.S. manufacturing—something seemingly easy to quantify—depends on how one
chooses to define health: output or employment? In this case (and many others), the most complete
story comes from including both figures, as the Economist wisely chose to do in its graph.
Even when we agree on a single measure of success, say, student test scores, there is plenty of
statistical wiggle room. See if you can reconcile the following hypothetical statements, both of which
could be true:
Politician A (the challenger): “Our schools are getting worse! Sixty percent of our schools had
lower test scores this year than last year.”
Politician B (the incumbent): “Our schools are getting better! Eighty percent of our students had
higher test scores this year than last year.”
Here’s a hint: The schools do not all necessarily have the same number of students. If you take
another look at the seemingly contradictory statements, what you’ll see is that one politician is using
schools as his unit of analysis (“Sixty percent of our schools . . .”), and the other is using students as
the unit of analysis (“Eighty percent of our students . . .”). The unit of analysis is the entity being
compared or described by the statistics—school performance by one of them and student performance
by the other. It’s entirely possible for most of the students to be improving and most of the schools to
be getting worse—if the students showing improvement happen to be in very big schools. To make
this example more intuitive, let’s do the same exercise by using American states:
Politician A (a populist): “Our economy is in the crapper! Thirty states had falling incomes last
Politician B (more of an elitist): “Our economy is showing appreciable gains: Seventy percent of
Americans had rising incomes last year.”
What I would infer from those statements is that the biggest states have the healthiest economies:
New York, California, Texas, Illinois, and so on. The thirty states with falling average incomes are
likely to be much smaller: Vermont, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and so on. Given the disparity in the
size of the states, it’s entirely possible that the majority of states are doing worse while the majority
of Americans are doing better. The key lesson is to pay attention to the unit of analysis. Who or what
is being described, and is that different from the “who” or “what” being described by someone else?
Although the examples above are hypothetical, here is a crucial statistical question that is not: Is
globalization making income inequality around the planet better or worse? By one interpretation,
globalization has merely exacerbated existing income inequalities; richer countries in 1980 (as
measured by GDP per capita) tended to grow faster between 1980 and 2000 than poorer countries. 2
The rich countries just got richer, suggesting that trade, outsourcing, foreign investment, and the other
components of “globalization” are merely tools for the developed world to extend its economic
hegemony. Down with globalization! Down with globalization!
But hold on a moment. The same data can (and should) be interpreted entirely differently if one
changes the unit of analysis. We don’t care about poor countries; we care about poor people. And a
high proportion of the world’s poor people happen to live in China and…
Purchase answer to see full

We offer the bestcustom writing paper services. We have done this question before, we can also do it for you.

Why Choose Us

  • 100% non-plagiarized Papers
  • 24/7 /365 Service Available
  • Affordable Prices
  • Any Paper, Urgency, and Subject
  • Will complete your papers in 6 hours
  • On-time Delivery
  • Money-back and Privacy guarantees
  • Unlimited Amendments upon request
  • Satisfaction guarantee

How it Works

  • Click on the “Place Order” tab at the top menu or “Order Now” icon at the bottom and a new page will appear with an order form to be filled.
  • Fill in your paper’s requirements in the "PAPER DETAILS" section.
  • Fill in your paper’s academic level, deadline, and the required number of pages from the drop-down menus.
  • Click “CREATE ACCOUNT & SIGN IN” to enter your registration details and get an account with us for record-keeping and then, click on “PROCEED TO CHECKOUT” at the bottom of the page.
  • From there, the payment sections will show, follow the guided payment process and your order will be available for our writing team to work on it.